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THE WISDOM AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
RACE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN HIGHER
EDUCATION ADMISSION PROGRAMS:
A CRITICAL LOOK AT HOPWOOD V. TEXAS
INTRODUCTION
I yield to no one in my earnest hope that the time will
come when an "affirmative action" program is unneces-
sary, and is, in truth, only a relic of the past.... At some
time, beyond any period of what some would claim is only
transitional inequality, the United States must and will
reach a stage of maturity where action along this line is
no longer necessary. Then persons will be regarded as
persons, and discrimination of the type we address today
will be an ugly feature of history that is instructive but
that is behind us.1
Unfortunately, the United States has not yet reached the "stage
of maturity" Justice Blackmun earnestly hoped for, forcing legisla-
tures and courts to struggle with the wisdom and constitutionality
of using race as a factor in federal and state decision-making.
Recently, the Fifth Circuit in the highly publicized case, Hopwood
v. Texas,2 confronted this issue and severely restricted the ability
of higher educational institutions to consider race a pertinent factor
in admissions decisions. Consequently, the number of minority stu-
dents entering the University of Texas Law School in the fall has
dropped significantly in comparison to past years when the Law
School's affirmative action program was utilized.3 If other lower
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 403 (1978) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part).
2 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. CL 2581 (1996).
1 Before Hopwood, the University of Texas Law School admitted a class that was
5.9% black and 6.3% Hispanic. See Ellis Cose, The Color Bind, NEWSWEmK, May 12,
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courts follow Hopwood and eliminate affirmative action programs
in institutions of higher education, minority enrollment will also
decrease dramatically. The district court opinion in Hopwood noted
that without the affirmative action program used by the Law
School, only nine African-Americans and eighteen Mexican-Ameri-
cans would have been admitted in 1993.' A broader study of the
effects of affirmative action in law school admissions found that of
the 3,435 blacks accepted by at least one law school in 1990-91,
only 687 would have been accepted on grades and LSAT scores
alone.'
This Note argues that, due to the unique nature of education,
affirmative action6 needs to be retained in the educational setting.
This Note also urges courts reviewing admissions programs not to
blindly follow Hopwood's misinterpretation of Supreme Court
precedent Instead, courts should continue to follow Supreme
Court mandates which envision permissible circumstances for the
use of race in admissions decisions.
Part I of this Note reviews Supreme Court and lower federal
court cases dealing with affirmative action and Hopwood, the most
recent court of appeals treatment of the use of race as a factor in
admissions programs. Part II exposes the major flaws in
Hopwood's analysis of the present state of affirmative action juris-
prudence and argues there are several compelling reasons for al-
1997, at 58. With the affirmative action program eliminated by Hopwood, the class admit-
ted to enter in the fall of 1997 is 0.7% black and 2.3% Hispanic. See id.
See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 573 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
5. See Linda F. Wightnan, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical
Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admissions
Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1997) (demonstrating the falling numbers of minority
admissions without affirmative action).
" There are many types of affirmative action and its lack of definition is responsible
for much of the controversy and misunderstanding surrounding its application. According
to David Oppenheimer, there are five pervasive methods of "affirmative action" including:
(1) quotas, which are the use of absolute floors and ceilings for the selection of minori-
ties; (2) preferences, which allow for the consideration of race in making selections; (3)
self-studies, which involve an examination by decision-makers of how they select employ-
ees, contractors, or students; (4) outreach and counseling, which use targeted recruitment
to increase the pool of minority applicants from which selections are made; and (5) anti-
discrimination, which involves the adoption of aggressive non-discrimination policies, such
as diversity and anti-harassment training. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Understanding
Affirmative Action, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q., 921, 923 (1996).
' Most glaringly, the Hopwood court misconstrues the holdings of Adarand Construc-
tors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1991), and
Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), discussed more fully
infra.
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lowing educational institutions to consider a person's race for ad-
missions purposes.
I. BACKGROUND
This section first includes a detailed description of Hopwood,
the case at issue in this Note. Next, a discussion of Regents of
University of California v. Bakke,' the Court's only opinion specif-
ically addressing the constitutionality of race-based affirmative ac-
tion policies in admissions programs, is helpful for understanding
this Note's later analyses of the mistakes made in Hopwood. Third,
United States v. Fordice,9 the Supreme Court's most recent articu-
lation of its position concerning desegregation in higher education,
is useful in determining whether Hopwood is consistent with Su-
preme Court mandates. Fourth, Podberesky v. Kirwan"° provides
an interesting comparison to Hopwood in its treatment of affirma-
tive action in the educational context at a university plagued by
continuing effects of past de jure discrimination similar to those in
Texas. Finally, in order to understand the Court's current constitu-
tional construction of affirmative action under the Equal Protection
Clause, an analysis of Adarand Constructors v. Pena," the latest
Supreme Court decision on affirmative action, is necessary.
A. Hopwood v. Texas"
The Hopwood case began when foui white law school appli-
cants sued the University of Texas Law School,13 claiming that
their denial of admission constituted a violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 4 They based this assertion on the fact that they
had achieved higher LSAT scores and GPA scores than several
African-American and Mexican-American students offered admis-
sion. 5 In the spring of 1992, the year the plaintiffs were denied
admission, the University of Texas Law School employed a two-
tiered admissions system with separate admissions standards for (1)
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
9- 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
'- 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).
"- 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
,2 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
", The University of Texas Law School will hereinafter be referred to as "the Law
SchooL"
" See 78 F.3d at 934.
,x See id. The Law School stipulated that all of the plaintiffs in this case would have
been admitted in the African-American and Mexican-American system. See id, at 936-38.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
African- and Mexican-Americans, and (2) whites and other minori-
ties.
The Law School defended its admissions program on the
grounds that (1) prior discrimination by the State of Texas in pri-
mary, secondary, and undergraduate institutions directly affected the
educational achievement of the pool of minority applicants; and (2)
the current law school admissions program was implemented to
discharge the school's duty of eliminating the vestiges of past
segregation. 6 Therefore, the Law School argued, it had a compel-
ling justification for using race as a factor in admissions decisions.
Furthermore, the Law School asserted its interest in a racially
diverse student body was protected by the First Amendment guar-
antee of academic freedom and was sufficiently compelling to
withstand an Equal Protection challenge.
The district court, following Adarand, applied strict scrutiny to
the admissions process, which required a compelling objective
narrowly tailored toward achieving its goals. 7 Both the Law
School's goal of remedying the effects of past discrimination in the
State's educational system as a whole and the desire to have a
diverse student body were found to be compelling objectives. 8 In
its discussion of the remedial goal, the district court held that
because the State of Texas' institutions of higher education are
inextricably linked to the primary and secondary schools in the
system, 9 Texas' long history of facially discriminatory practices
in those schools presently affected the Law School's minority pop-
ulation." The district court found evidence similar to that relied
upon in Podberesky v. Kirwan2W' to determine that the present ef-
fects of past discrimination were sufficiently severe to cause the
remedial objective to be compelling. That evidence included: (1) a
reputation for an atmosphere of racial hostility;' (2) a significant-
ly low percentage of minority students enrolled in the school;'
16 See id.
'" See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 568 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
' See id. at 570 (stating that these two aims are consistent with previous court deci-
sions determining that they are compelling state interests).
. See id. at 571.
See id. at 572.
21. 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994). For a detailed discussion of Podberesky, see infra
notes 97-108 and accompanying text.
See 861 F. Supp. at 572.
" See id.
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and (3) a general feeling of isolation among minority students
The court further noted that "were the [District] Court to limit its
review to the University of Texas, [it] would still find a 'strong
evidentiary basis for concluding that remedial action is neces-
sary.' 2
5
Upon consideration of the diversity objective, the court found
that "[a]bsent an explicit statement from the Supreme Court over-
ruling Bakke .... in the context of the Law School's admission
process, obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a racially
and ethnically diverse student body remains a sufficiently compel-
ling interest to support the use of racial classifications." A close
examination of the minority applicants who would have been ad-
mitted without the affirmative action plan revealed that a race-
neutral plan would not produce significant numbers of African-
American or Mexican-American students. Furthermore, the court
found the problem so egregious that other methods, including mi-
nority scholarships and recruitment, would not yield a racially di-
verse student body.' Finally, the court noted that important safe-
guards existed to combat abuse of this system, including its flexi-
ble nature, regular reviews by the admissions committee, and the
rational relationship between the target population of minorities in
the student body and those in the population of high school gradu-
ates in the State of Texas.29 Despite these findings, however, the
district court held that the two-track admissions program was un-
constitutional under Bakke since minority and non-minority candi-
dates were precluded from competing in the same system? Con-
sequently, the program was not narrowly tailored to achieving the
objectives it sought.3
In affirming the trial court's finding that the Law School's
system was unlawful, the Fifth Circuit issued a sweeping indi t-
ment of affmnative action, holding that it would be lawful only
under very narrow circumstances. The court began its analysis of
the remedial objective of the admissions program by stating that
2,. See id. at 573.
21 Id. at 572.
2' Id. at 570-71.
27. See id. at 571 (stressing the lack of diversity in schools without affirmative action
programs).
. See id. at 573-74.
29 See id. at 574-75.
2- See id. at 579.
31. See id.
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prior precedent permits racial classifications when strong evidence
exists that remedial action is necessary.32 The court held in order
for past discrimination to justify a race-based program, the entity
seeking to remedy the discrimination must be the perpetrator of the
past discrimination. Therefore, the Law School, not the State of
Texas' educational system or even the University of Texas system
as a whole, is the only state actor whose discrimination can be
used to validate such an admissions program.' According to the
court, "the use of racial remedies must be carefully limited, and a
remedy reaching all education within a state addresses a putative
injury that is vague and amorphous . . . [and has] no logical stop-
ping point."35
Furthermore, the court severely limited the types of present
effects of past discrimination sufficient to demonstrate that, for a
specific actor, a remedial plan would be justified. For example, the
court found the Law School's lingering bad reputation in the mi-
nority community' and the perception that the Law School was a
hostile environment for minorities' were insufficient evidence of
the requisite past discrimination. According to the court, these
conditions were the effects of societal discrimination for which the
Law School could not be held accountable." Moreover, the court
found the Law School's admitted and documented past de jure
discrimination against African- and Mexican-Americans as recent as
the 1960s was irrelevant to the problem at hand in 1996.2" Ac-
cording to the court, "any racial tension at the law school is most
certainly the result of present societal discrimination and, if any-
thing, is contributed to, rather than alleviated by, the overt and
prevalent consideration of race in admissions."'  This fact ren-
dered the plan unconstitutional according to the court's interpreta-
tion of Bakke and its progeny.41
3" See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 942 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2581 (1996) (stating that the racial classifications were only narrowly permitted).
See id. at 950.
34 See id.
35. id.
36 See id. at 952 (discussing the general climate of relations for the school).
3". See id.
3- See id. at 953.
19* See id. at 954 (stating that the court did not wish to view the past as a present
justification for the Law School's alleged policy after the Law School argued their policy
was a result of past procedure).
Id. at 953.
4" See id. at 954-55.
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Next, the Fifth Circuit turned to a discussion of the Law
School's desire to achieve a racially diverse student body. The
court acknowledged that Bakke stood for the proposition that "[t]he
attainment of a diverse student body clearly is a constitutionally
permissible goal for an institution of higher education." 2 Never-
theless, the court interpreted intervening Supreme Court cases to re-
quire a finding that "any consideration of race or ethnicity by the
law school for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is
not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment."'43
Consequently, the court held race can never be used by an educa-
tional institution to determine a person's contribution to a diverse
student body. According to the court, an institution "may properly
favor one applicant over another because of his ability to play the
cello, make a downfield tackle, or understand chaos theory... [or
on the basis of] his home state or relationship to school alumni."'
Furthermore, the Law School can look at factors such as unusual
or substantial extracurricular activities in college, whether an
applicant's parents attended the law school, or the applicant's eco-
nomic and social background.45 However, the court reasoned that
the minority experience is no different from the collective Ameri-
can experience, so the use of race as a proxy for diverse back-
grounds would not yield the truly diverse student body the Law
School claimed to be seeking.4
In sum, the Hopwood court decided: (1) race can only be a
factor in admissions decisions where there is evidence of present
effects of recent, identifiable racial discrimination by the specific
school seeking to remedy the discrimination; and (2) the school
must remedy the discrimination by allowing only the person previ-
ously discriminated against to use that person's race as a mild
"plus" in the next admissions procedure.47
4 Id. at 943 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311 (1978)).
In Bakke, Justice Powell found the strict racial quota system used by the University of
California at Davis was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy strict scrutiny since it
made race the determinative factor for a specific number of seats in the entering class.
However, Justice Powell clearly held race could be a factor in admissions decisions, when
used in combination with other factors, to achieve diversity.
" 78 F.3d at 944 (discussing permissible compelling interests).
4I Id. at 946.
' See id. (discussing other factors potentially considered for admission).
4". See i.
4" See id. at 954.
13919971
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B. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke s
At issue in Bakke was the use of a medical school admissions
program that reserved 16 seats in each entering class of 100 for
disadvantaged,49 minority'm students. Bakke, a white male who
was denied admission, sued the University of California at Davis
alleging the admissions program violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution and Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VI").5 '
Three main opinions were written, one by Justice Powell, who
was the swing vote on all of the issues and the author of the
Court's opinion; one by Justice Brennan (joined by Justices White,
Marshall, and Blackmun), who found the Davis plan constitutional,
and one by Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Burger, Stewart, and
Rehnquist), who did not reach the constitutional issue and instead
found the program unlawful under Title VI, which expressly bars
racial discrimination by any federally-assisted institution.
Justice Powell began his analysis of the constitutionality, of
Davis' admission program with a determination that any racial
classification must pass strict scrutiny in order to be constitution-
al.52 To withstand this rigorous test, the racial classification of an
admissions program must be narrowly tailored to accomplish a
"compelling" objective. Davis asserted four objectives of the admis-
sions program: (1) to reduce the historic deficit of traditionally
disfavored minorities in medical schools and the medical profes-
sion; (2) to counter the effects of societal discrimination; (3) to
increase the number of physicians who will practice in communi-
ties currently under-served; and (4) to obtain the educational bene-
fits that flow from an ethnically diverse student body. 3
Justice Powell categorized the first objective as a naked racial
preference which was "discrimination for its own sake," and thus
facially invalid.54 The second objective, that of remedying the ef-
'" 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
,9 See id. at 275. Admissions officers closely exarnined applications for evidence of
educational or economic hardship in order to determine disadvantage.
' See id. Only African-Americans, Chicanos, and Asian-Americans could compete for
these seats.
", Bakke based this assertion on the fact that his MCAT scores and GPA were high-
er than some of the minorities' scores who were admitted. See id.
- See 438 U.S. at 291 ("Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently
suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination.").
. See id. at 306.
Id. at 307.
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fects of societal discrimination, was also found not to satisfy strict
scrutiny." However, Justice Powell held that a state has a compel-
ling interest in remedying the effects of particular, identifiable
cases of discrimination.
According to Justice Powell, affirmative action can be used in
cases where explicit judicial, legislative, or administrative find-
ings' establish the entity's program seeks to redress specific con-
stitutional or statutory violations perpetrated by the entity itself.'
In other words, if an authoritative agency had found Davis' admis-
sions programs had discriminated against African-Americans, Chica-
nos, and Asian-Americans in the past, and the present program was
an attempt to remedy this past discrimination, Davis' affirmative
action plan might satisfy strict scrutiny. However, Davis had not
sought to cure a particular past discriminatory event but only soci-
etal discrimination, which Justice Powell determined was not a
compelling objective.58
The third goal of the Davis program, increasing the number of
physicians in presently under-served communities, was dismissed
by Justice Powell due to the lack of evidence that minorities were
more likely to practice in these communities.59 Justice Powell
quoted the Supreme Court of California's holding:
[a]n applicant of whatever race who has demonstrated his
concern for disadvantaged minorities in the past and who
declares that practice in such a community is his primary
professional goal would be more likely to contribute to
alleviation of the medical shortage than one who is chosen
entirely on the basis of race and disadvantage.'
5' See id. This objective failed strict scrutiny because it was not sufficiently narrowly
tailored to benefit only those harmed and burden only those responsible for the previous
harm. See id.
' Justice Powell emphasized that Davis itself was n6t capable of making the requisite
findings. "Petitioner [Davis] . . . is in no position to make such findings. [Wlsolated seg-
ments of our vast governmental structures are not competent to make those decisions, at
least in the absence of legislative mandates and legislatively determined criteria." Id. at
309.
". See id. at 307-09. A later interpretation of this standard, in City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), held the public entity enacting the affirmative
action plan need not be found to have itself discriminated if it can show there has been
clear and severe discrimination by an industry as a whole which can only be remedied by
a race-conscious plan.
See 438 U.S. at 307.
See id. at 310.
Id. at 311 (quoting Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152, 1167 (Cal.
19971
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Finally, Justice Powell recognized the desire to attain a diverse
student body is a compelling interest and "clearly-... a constitu-
tionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education" as
long as the university chooses means narrowly tailored to achieve
that goal.6' According to Powell, the means used by Davis, a
strict quota system, were not narrowly tailored to produce a racial-
ly mixed medical school class.62 However, he found it permissible
to use race as one factor among others to achieve the goal of
diversity in accordance with a university's First Amendment right
to academic freedom. 63 Consequently, as long as a specific num-
ber of seats are not reserved exclusively for minorities, and other
factors are combined with race to determine an individual's capaci-
ty to contribute to diversity, a university admissions program that
uses race as a factor will withstand strict scrutiny under Bakke."
Because it characterized the Davis admissions program as a
benign race-based classification, the Brennan opinion used interme-
diate scrutiny to test the constitutionality of the program, requiring
it serve "important" governmental objectives and be "substantially
related" to the achievement of those objectives.65 According to
Justice Brennan, the Davis plan's quota system survived intermedi-
ate scrutiny, because:
the purpose of remedying the effects of societal discrimina-
tion is . . . sufficiently important to justify the use of race-
conscious admissions programs where there is a sound
basis for concluding that minority underrepresentation is
substantial and chronic, and that the handicap of past dis-
crimination is impeding access of minorities to the Medical
School.'
The Brennan opinion reasoned that under Title VI, Congress
may require or authorize preferential treatment for those likely
disadvantaged by societal racial discrimination.' This may be
done without finding past intentional discrimination by those offer-
1976)).
61. Id. at 311-12.
62 See id. at 289, 315.
613. See id. at 314-16.
See id. at 316-18.
I" d. at 359.
6 Id. at 362.
67. See id. at 366.
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hng preferential treatment or through a case-by-case determination
that those to be benefitted suffered from discrimination.s It thus
follows that states may also adopt race-conscious programs de-
signed to overcome substantial minority underrepresentation where
there is reason to believe the evil addressed is a product of past
racial discrimination.' The Brennan opinion claimed a colorblind
solution did not exist70 and was not required to rectify the past
effects of societal discrimination! ' Furthermore, Brennan's opinion
asserted the use of race does not stigmatize any group as inferior,
rather, "it compensates applicants, who it is uncontested are fully
qualified to study medicine, for educational disadvantages which it
was reasonable to conclude were a product of state-fostered dis-
crimination." The Brennan opinion emphasized that once admit-
ted, these students would be required to satisfy the same criteria as
all other students in order to graduate; they would be taught by the
same faculty and subjected to the same examinations. 3
The third main opinion, written by the Stevens group, did not
reach the constitutional issue of an Equal Protection violation. In-
stead, the Stevens grotip found the program to be unlawful under
Title VI, which prohibits the use of race as a basis for excluding
anyone from participation in a federally funded program.74 By
agreeing that the program violated Title VI, Justice Powell added
the fifth vote which sounded the death knell for Davis' admissions
plan.
75
Despite the fact that the Davis plan was found to be untena-
ble,7' one very important idea emerged from Bakke: Justices
" See id.
See id.
See . at 376.
7'" See id. at 355-56. According to the Brennan opinion, the idea that our Constitution
is colorblind "has never been adopted by this Court as the proper meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause. Indeed, we have expressly rejected this proposition on a number of
occasions." Id.
7- Id. at 374-76.
71 See id. at 376.
71 See id. at 412-13.
" See id. at 284-87. No opinion garnered the support of five justices on the subject
of the constitutionality of the Davis plan. Justice Powell agreed with Justices Brennan et
al. that Title VI was only violated if the Constitution had also been violated, so both of
those opinions analyzed the constitutional issues. However, the opinions came down in
opposite directions. Because the Stevens group did not look at the constitutional issues,
only Justice Powell's opinion holds the Davis plan to be invalid on constitutional grounds.
-' The Brennan group did not address the issue of whether the goal of achieving di-
versity satisfied intermediate scrutiny. However, it is reasonable to assume they would
1997]
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Powell, Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun agreed that race
could be a factor in admissions decisions at the professional school
level, provided other factors such as geographic region, community
activities, and athletic participation were also used.'
C. United States v. Fordice 8
In 1954, the Supreme Court held public education must be
fully integrated, rejecting the notion of "separate but equal" found
in Brown v. Board of Education.9 A year later, the Court re-
quired the end of segregated public education "with all deliberate
speed."8 In Fordice, the Court had the opportunity to decide
when a public university, as opposed to a public elementary or
secondary school, has discharged its obligation to dismantle its
prior de jure segregated educational system."'
Mississippi's educational institutions claimed they had met their
obligation to promote integration by removing all legal barriers to
minority enrollment in state-supported institutions.' The institu-
tions asserted that, because students had the freedom to choose
which university to attend, the fact that the universities remained
largely segregated was the effect of societal forces rather than
institutional discrimination.' However, the Court held a state has
an affirmative duty not only to implement race-neutral policies, but
also to actively dismantle all vestiges of segregation policy.s4 Ac-
cording to the Court:
If the State perpetuates policies and practices traceable to
its prior system that continue to have segregative ef-
fects-whether by influencing student enrollment decisions
or by fostering segregation in other facets of the university
system-and such policies are without sound educational
justification and can be practicably eliminated, the State has
have found it to be an important state interest, given their expansive views on when race
can constitutionally be a factor in a decision. See id. at 362-69.
T" See id. at 320, 325.
505 U.S. 717 (1991).
- 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
81. See 505 U.S. at 721.
See id. at 725.
See id.
See id. at 729.
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not satisfied its burden of proving that it has dismantled its
prior system."5
The Court was careful to establish that the university or the
state need not intend to perpetuate prior discrimination in order to
be in violation of the Constitution.86 The Court admonished the
court of appeals for ignoring the undisturbed factual findings of the
district court that there remained several surviving aspects of
Mississippi's prior dual system that were constitutionally suspect,
for even though such policies were facially race neutral, they sub-
stantially restricted a person's choice of which institution to enter
and contributed to the racial identifiability of the eight public uni-
versities.'
One of the main policies the Court found to perpetuate racial
segregation was the admissions policy. The State of Mississippi's
university system had five historically white universities and three
historically black universities. According to the admissions policies
of the schools, any applicant who had an ACT88 score of 15 or
higher qualified for automatic admission to any of the five histori-
cally white institutions, while any applicant with an ACT score of
13 or higher qualified for automatic admission to any of the histor-
ically black universities. These standards were originally adopted
for the purpose of maintaining racially segregated institutions.89
However, when challenged, the State responded that the policies
were currently used to redress the problems of student unprepared-
ness,' grade inflation, and lack of comparability in grading prac-
tices and course offerings among high schools.9 The Court did
not accept this justification since the policy was traceable to the de
jure system and had present discriminatory effects, given that, at
the time of this litigation, the average ACT score for white stu-
dents was 18 and the average score for blacks was 7.' Further-
more, 72 percent of Mississippi's white high school seniors
achieved an ACT composite score of 15 or better (the necessary
I d. at 731.
See id. at 733 n.8.
" See id. at 732-33.
t "ACT" refers to the American College Testing Program, which provides standard-
ized tests for college admission. Every Mississippi resident under 21 years of age seeking
admission to the university system was required to take the test. See id. at 734.
'" See id.
See id. at 737.
9, See id. at 734.
9L See id. at 735.
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minimum for automatic admission to any of the five historically
white schools), while less than 30 percent of black high school
seniors earned that score. 3 This disparity maintained the segregat-
ed nature of the universities for the obvious reason that many
blacks would be denied admission because their scores did not
meet university standards; it also caused blacks to choose not to
apply to those schools if they failed to achieve the advertised mini-
mum scores.
Furthermore, the Court noted another constitutionally problem-
atic aspect of the State's exclusive use of ACT scores: it provided
an incomplete picture of the applicant's ability to perform ade-
quately in college.94 If the University had used high school grades
in addition to ACT scores, it would have had both a more accurate
idea of the student's potential college performance, and a much
more diverse student body. The disparity between black and white
students' high school grades was much narrower.9"
Ultimately, the Court found the justifications asserted by the
University for the ACT requirement were inadequate, since they
were originally adopted for discriminatory purposes and were cur-
rently traceable to those purposes. In addition, the ACT require-
ment continued to have segregative effects, and the State failed to
show the ACT-only admissions standard was not susceptible to
elimination without eroding sound educational policy."
D. Podberesky v. Kirwan 7
A more recent struggle in the lower federal courts over the role
of affirmative action in education occurred at the University of
Maryland98 when Daniel Podberesky alleged a violation of Equal
Protection due to the University's use of a scholarship program
available only to African-American students." The objective of
the scholarship program was to attract African-American students to
the University in an effort to combat the lingering effects of de-
cades of well-documented discrimination by the University. The
district court found the following four present effects of racial
9 See id. at 737.
94 See id. at 736.
9' See id. at 737.
9' See id. at 738.
" 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).
Hereinafter referred to as "the University."
9- See 38 F.3d at 152.
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discrimination which substantiated the University's claim that the
remedying of past discrimination was a compelling objective: (1)
the African-American community widely believed that the Universi-
ty of Maryland engaged in discriminatory acts; (2) the racial com-
position of the University revealed underrepresentation of African-
Americans; (3) African-Americans who enrolled in the University
suffered an unexplainably high attrition rate; and (4) the University
provided a hostile racial environment for African-Americans." °
Having found the remedying of these present effects of discrimina-
tion to be a compelling objective, the court analyzed the scholar-
ship program to determine whether it was narrowly tailored to
achieve this objective.'"' The court's analysis yielded the follow-
ing findings which suggested the program would survive strict
scrutiny: (1) the race-neutral means used by the University in the
past had not produced significant numbers of African-American
students;' (2) the program's goals were narrowly tailored to the
numbers of African-American high school graduates who anticipat-
ed attending college;0 3 and (3) the race-based scholarships did
not adversely impact members of other races because many other
scholarship opportunities remained for them.' Consequently, the
program easily passed strict scrutiny, and the district court found it
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause."5
However, on appeal, the Fourth Circuit approached the applica-
tion of strict scrutiny in a different manner, requiring a showing by
the University that the present conditions of racial animosity were
caused by past instances of discrimination by the University. 6
The court ignored an enormous amount of evidence in finding the
present racial climate was merely a product of societal discrim-
ination, unattachable to the University itself.'" After deciding the
"compelling objective" component of strict scrutiny was unsubstan-
tiated, the court concluded many facets of the program were not
narrowly tailored to achieving the goals it sought.' t As a result,
the scholarship program was found unconstitutional.
' See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 838 F. Supp. 1075, 1082-83 (D. Md. 1993).
10,. See id. at 1094.
' See id. at 1095.
1. See id. at 1096.
lot See id.
,. See id. at 1098.
' See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 155 (4th Cir. 1994).
" See id. at 155.
'" See id. at 157-58.
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E. Adarand Constructors v. Pena'09
Adarand, the most recent case on affirmative action decided by
the Supreme Court, severely restricts the use of affirmative action
by the federal government. Adarand Constructors, Inc. was a con-
struction firm that bid for a subcontract for a federal highway
project. Despite the fact that Adarand's bid for the job was lowest,
the general contractor awarded the job to a minority-owned firm
which qualified as a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE)" °
in order to receive a financial incentive from the federal govern-
ment. The Court held this program of offering financial incentives
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
as applied to the states and the corresponding component of the
Fifth Amendment as applied to the federal government.
One of the most important rules discussed in previous Supreme
Court cases but firmly established in Adarand is that strict scrutiny
must be applied when reviewing any government (federal or state)
policy or practice condoning decision-making based on race. Ac-
cordingly, the Court vowed to be "skeptical" of any preference
based on racial or ethnic criteria,"' and "consistent" in applying
strict scrutiny to all race-based classifications, regardless of the race
of those benefitted or burdened."2 However, the Adarand Court
wanted to ensure that strict scrutiny would not be "strict in theory
but fatal in fact."". Accordingly, the Court suggested an
institution's desire to remedy identifiable past discrimination would
be a sufficiently compelling objective to satisfy strict scrutiny as
long as it was narrowly tailored to the original discriminating enti-
ty."4 Most importantly, in references to Bakke, the majority af-
firmed Justice Powell's opinion that strict scrutiny applies to race-
based admissions decisions." 5
The Adarand opinion severely restricts the circumstances that
justify affirmative action programs in any context. Clearly, a Con-
9- See 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
"' Firms owned by ethnic minorities or women were presumed to be DBEs, while
white male-owned finms had to prove disadvantage by clear and convincing evidence. See
id. at 207-08.
-. See id. at 223.
' See id.





RACE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN ADMISSIONS
gressional finding of the need to remedy past discrimination would
satisfy the "compelling objective" component of strict scrutiny;
however, the type of program that would be narrowly tailored with
this objective in mind is less clear. In order for such a program to
be narrowly tailored, no equally effective race-neutral remedy may
be available, and the program must be designed so as not to be
overinclusive (including those who do not need help) or
underinclusive (failing to include those who need help). Finally,
Adarand left unanswered the question of whether the goal of in-
creasing diversity in an educational or similar context is sufficiently
compelling to satisfy strict scrutiny. Since Adarand was decided,
constitutional scholars have feared many institutions would discon-
tinue their affirmative action plans, further dividing society along
racial lines and providing greater educational opportunities to
whites than blacks."1 6 Recently, the Hopwood decision confirmed
those scholars' fears by applying the principles of the affirmative
action cases from Bakke to Adarand very rigorously and finding
the University of Texas Law School's preferential admission pro-
gram unconstitutional.
II. HopwooD's FUNDAMENTAL ERRORS
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Hopwood
v. Texas, leaving Hopwood standing as precedent in the Fifth Cir-
cuit and as a model for other circuits." ' Upon close analysis,
however, there are four reasons why other courts faced with similar
issues in the educational context should ignore Hopwood and con-
tinue to follow Bakke. First, Hopwood's ruling conflicts with two
Supreme Court cases that remain binding precedent on every court
in this nation."1 Second, the educational context requires a
unique legal analysis permitting a distinction between preferences
in law school admissions and preferences in the context of state
and federal construction contracts dealt with in the cases relied
"' For example, one scholar wrote "[bly limiting the remedies available to minorities
to overcome discrimination and gain equal opportunity, the Court's new constitutional
jurisprudence foreshadows increased divisions of society along racial lines between the
better educated, richer, politically empowered white 'haves' and the uneducated, poorer,
unrepresented minority 'have-nots."' Frank R. Parker, The Damaging Consequences of the
Rehnquist Court's Commitment to Colorblindness Versus Racial Justice, 45 AM. L. REV.
763, 766 (1996).
,7 See 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1991); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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upon in Hopwood. Third, the Hopwood court erred in failing to
recognize that diversity is an interest sufficiently compelling to
satisfy strict scrutiny. Finally, the Hopwood court blatantly ignored
the present status of race relations and the continuing effects of
past discrimination which have yet to be remedied by the Universi-
ty of Texas Law School.
A. Hopwood Ignores and Misapplies Supreme Court Precedent
Bakke remains binding precedent on all courts in this na-
tion."9 Affirmative action cases decided since Bakke which have
found the race-based preferences at issue to be unconstitutional
have been careful to avoid overturning specific parts of Bakke. For
example, in Adarand the Court discussed the holdings of many
prior cases and either upheld or overruled them; ° yet Bakke's
assertion that race can be one factor among many used in admis-
sions decisions remained untouched after Adarand." In fact, the
Supreme Court has never suggested that the Constitution is color-
blind." Rather, the Court has expressly rejected this proposi-
tion." In many cases, the Supreme Court itself ordered or af-
finmed race-based decisions or explicitly envisioned circumstances
in which race could constitutionally be considered." If the Court
119. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 954 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S Ct.
2581 (1996).
See 515 U.S. at 213-18.
121. The Adarand opinion clearly envisions circumstances in which race can affect gov-
ernment decision-making:
[We wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, but fatal
in fact" .... The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering
effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an
unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in response
to it. As recently as 1987, for example, every Justice of this Court agreed that
the Alabama Department of Public Safety's "pervasive, systematic, and obstinate
discriminatory conduct" justified a narrowly tailored race-based remedy.
515 U.S. at 237; see also United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987).
See 438 U.S. at 336, 355-56.
1. See id. at 356.
I See, e.g., United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); North Carolina Bd.
of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45-46 (1971); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192
(1964); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U;S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 100-01 (1943). In his Bakke opinion, Justice Marshall persuasively
rejects the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits consideration of race in an at-
tempt to remedy the cumulative effects of discrimination. "Since the Congress that consid-
ered and rejected the objections to the 1866 Freedmen's Bureau Act concerning special
relief to Negroes also proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, it is inconceivable that the
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wanted to overrule any part of Bakke, Adarand was the perfect
opportunity to do so since the Court was clearly attempting to
settle the law of race-based classifications. However, in refraining
from overruling this portion of Bakke, Adarand gave a silent nod,
reaffirming Bakke's holding and permitting the lower courts to
continue to experiment with the issue. Moreover, if the Supreme
Court had wanted to overturn Bakke, Hopwood gave it another
opportunity to do so because the' facts and issues in Bakke and
Hopwood were sufficiently similar. Instead, the Court denied certio-
rari on the grounds that the issues were moot, the Law School
having changed its admissions program."as
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit concluded Justice Powell's Bakke
opinion, which acknowledged the compelling nature of the diversity
objective, "garnered only his own vote and has never represented
the view of a majority of the Court in Bakke or any other
case. ''""s Consequently, the Fifth Circuit concluded "Justice
Powell's view in Bakke is not binding precedent on this issue."'"
After deciding Bakke has no precedential value on this issue, the
Fifth Circuit held "any consideration of race or ethnicity by the
law school for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is
not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. m"
This position is an overly broad extension of the law that was
unnecessary to the disposition of the Hopwood case. 29 This cre-
ative application of Bakke ignores the fact that, while the Supreme
Court in Bakke disapproved of the means by which Davis sought
to achieve its goals, a majority of the Justices affirmed the consti-
tutionality of affirmative action programs that were sufficiently
limited.
Due to the controversial nature of Hopwood's holding, a peti-
tion for a panel rehearing en banc was circulated, but a majority of
judges denied the petition. However, a dissent from the denial of
the rehearing en banc was issued and signed by seven judges from
the Fifth Circuit.' The dissenters argued the Hopwood majority's
Fourteenth Amendment was itended to prohibit all race-conscious relief measures." 438
U.S. at 398 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
'2 See 116 S. Ct. 2581, 2582 (1996).




" See id. at 963 (Wiener, L, concurring).
10 See Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720 (1996).
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refusal to allow race as a factor in an admissions decision directly
defies Bakke.' Furthermore, the dissent calls the Fifth Circuit's
"judicial activism" "bad" and "wholly unnecessary to the disposi-
tion of the matter appealed and thus... clearly dictum; yet dic-
tum that is a frontal assault on contrary Supreme Court precedent
and thus not the kind of dictum we can ignore.' 32 This dictum
has infuriated the authors of the dissent from the denial for a re-
hearing en banc because "[t]he Supreme Court has left no doubt
that as a constitutionally inferior court, we are compelled to follow
faithfully a directly controlling Supreme Court precedent unless and
until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule it."'33 More-
over, "[i]f a precedent of [the Supreme] Court has direct applica-
tion in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some
other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the
case which directly controls, leaving to [the Supreme] Court the
prerogative of overruling its own decisions."'" In conclusion, the
dissent from the denial of a rehearing en banc asserted that, in
deciding that race cannot be a factor in admissions decisions, the
Hopwood court:
[went] out of its way to break ground that the Supreme
Court itself has been careful to avoid and purport[ed] to
overrule a Supreme Court decision, [Bakke]. The radical
implications of this opinion, with its sweeping dicta, will
literally change the face of public educational institutions
throughout Texas, the other states of this circuit, and this
nation. 3
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit's decision is glaringly inconsistent
with United States v. Fordice36 While the court correctly ac-
knowledged that Fordice requires a state to remove policies tied to
the past that it currently uses as a vehicle for discrimination, it
-. See id. at 722.
132 Id.
13. Id. See also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989). The Fifth Circuit is certainly aware of this rule. It was cited in a 1994 decision,
Wilkerson v. Whitley, 28 F.3d 498 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 740
(1995). This decision was written by Hopwood author Jerry Smith. Gabriel J. Chin, Bakke
to the Wall: The Crisis of Bakkean Diversity, 4 WM. & MARY BELL RTs. J. 881, 944
(1996).
"t 490 U.S. at 484.
"' 84 F.3d at 722.
" 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
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ignores the central thrust of the Fordice opinion that urges states to
implement policies that remedy that discrimination "with all delib-
erate speed."'37 As of April 4, 1996, the University of Texas Law
School had not, according to the Department of Education, met its
affirmative requirement to eliminate past discrimination to the
extent mandated by Title VI and the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Furthermore, the Law School's hostile racial environment and lin-
gering bad reputation among minorities certainly affects student
enrollment in the way Fordice urged academic institutions to re-
dress. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit concluded "any racial tension
at the law school is most certainly the result of present societal
discrimination," ignoring a mountain of evidence to the con-
trary.'39 In so concluding, the court incorrectly asserted that as
soon as blacks legally gained admittance to the Law School all
racism ended.'" This assertion ignores the reality expressed in
Fordice that pervasive racism by an institution does not "end"
merely when people of color are admitted. Yet the Fifth Circuit
conveniently ignores this evidence and the Fordice requirement
that:
In light of [a] State's long history of discrimination, and
the lost educational and career opportunities and stigmatic
harms caused by discriminatory educational systems ....
the courts below must carefully examine [a state's] prof-
fered justifications for maintaining a remnant of de jure
segregation to ensure that such rationales do not merely
mask the perpetuation of discriminatory practices. 4'
Finally, under Fordice, the mere adoption of race-neutral ad-
missions policies, without more, is not an adequate remedy for past
discrimination if it does not truly open the doors of an institution
to those who have been unwelcome. However, this is precisely the
remedy Hopwood suggests. Due to the extensive and pervasive
discriminatory circumstances that prevailed at the time Hopwood
was filed, the State of Texas was obligated by Fordice to act affir-
'" Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 556-57 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
'- Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 953 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2581 (1996).
" The court stated: "While the school once did practice de jure discrimination in
denying admission to blacks, the Court in Sweatt v. Painter struck down the law school's
program. Any other discrimination by the law school ended in the 1960's." Id.
'" 505 U.S. at 744 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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matively to eliminate the vestiges of segregation "root and
branch."'42 Certainly, the use of some type of affirmative action
program by the University of Texas Law School would seem ap-
propriate.
B. The Educational Context Requires a Unique Legal Analysis
Hopwood's legal analysis is further flawed because the contexts
in which the Supreme Court has found affimnative action programs
to be unconstitutional are significantly different and distinguishable
from the educational context providing the background for the
issues in Hopwood.43 The Hopwood court concludes this con-
textual distinction is unimportant, holding that, whatever the con-
text, remedying the past effects of discrimination is the only com-
pelling interest justifying racial classifications. However, several
interests unique to the educational setting illustrate the importance
of maintaining affirmative action programs in higher education.
To begin, discrimination in education ensures discrimination in
every other facet of life. If we do not allow people of all races to
be equally educated, we will never have a heterogeneous work
force, as discrimination in education is a self-perpetuating cycle.
When people of any race are kept out of positions of power and
prestige, which they are much more likely to be if they do not
achieve a college or graduate school education, racism flourish-
es.'" This happens for several reasons.
First, if few minorities are seen in these positions, people who
are predisposed to racist beliefs presume that minorities are not
capable of achieving positions of power or prestige.45 Second,
I42 d. at 727.
,. See the special concurrence to the Hopwood decision in which this distinction was
addressed by Judge Wiener:
Although I assume without deciding that diversity is a compelling interest, if I
had no choice but to address compelling interest I would do so in the context
in which the issue is presented, i.e., the constitutionally permissible means of
constructing an entering a [sic] class at a public graduate or professional
school. This unique context, first identified by Justice Powell, differs from the
employment context, differs from the minority business set-aside context, and
differs from the redistricting context; it comprises only the public higher educa-
tion context and implicates the uneasy marriage of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. ... Consequently, we play with fire when we assume an easy
crossover of Fourteenth Amendment maxims pronounced in cases decided in
such other contexts.
78 F.3d at 965 n.21.
See generally Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
, See Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Ac-
[V/ol. 48:133
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when people of color do not see other minorities succeeding, it is
reasonable for them to assume it is useless to try" or to blame
racism on the part of those in power for the lack of opportunities
given minorities. According to those who study discrimination in
elementary and secondary education, "people may be taught to
modify and restrict their choices.... [Clonditioned already by a
lifetime of such lessons, [they] may not even need to have their
dreams further restricted. The energy to break out of their isolation
may have atrophied already."'47
In contrast, when minorities are in positions of decision-making
authority, conditions in which decisions are made change in several
ways. First, minority decision-makers are acutely sensitive to rac-
ism among their coworkers and are better-positioned to ensure its
demise. Second, they serve as role models, giving other traditional-
ly oppressed people the feeling that they have a chance at success
in a particular field. Third, minority decision-makers realize minori-
ties can succeed, and stereotypes are broken down by education
about perceived differences and surprising similarities. Preferential
admissions will serve to remove psychological obstacles for minori-
ties who want to enter a traditionally segregated profession, bring
diverse viewpoints to the profession, and thus serve to desegregate
the profession both for minorities who wish to enter the profession
and those who need its services. None of these positive conse-
quences can occur, however, until this country ensures all of its
citizens have an equal opportunity to receive an adequate educa-
tion.
Many scholars have studied the educational opportunities for
minorities in this country, and the results are grim. According to
one scholar:
[Minorities continue to suffer the damaging effects of past
and present racial discrimination in education. The National
Research Council in its survey of the status of black Amer-
icans concluded that despite school desegregation and in-
creased federal financial assistance, "there remain persistent
and large gaps in the schooling quality and achievement
lion Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1331 (1986).
" This phenomenon has been termed "learned helplessness" by psychologists. Contin-
uous denial of rewards in response to effort causes motivation to be extinguished. See
generally JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
(1992).
-. Id. at 62.
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outcomes of education for blacks and whites." The Council
found that "separation and differential treatment of blacks
continue to be widespread in elementary and secondary
schools and in different forms in institutions of higher
learning." The Council also found that "after the 1970's,
the college-going chances of black high school graduates
have declined, and the proportion of advanced degrees
awarded to blacks has decreased."' 4
This is the inevitable result of several factors. First, a large
percentage of this country's minority population attends public, de
facto segregated primary and secondary schools in which condi-
tions, opportunities, and funding are unequal to those of white
schools, and are rapidly deteriorating.'" Many of these conditions
have been linked to the quality of education available, including
the teacher-to-student ratio, the quality of books and other supplies,
the level of parental involvement in students' learning, and the
degree to which the atmosphere is conducive to learning. Some of
these schools are devoid of science labs, art and music teachers,
and many teach their students from fifteen-year-old textbooks in
which Nixon is still the president.'50 Other schools ration soap,
paper towels, and toilet paper, and have two working bathrooms
for over 700 children.'5'
According to City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., the rele-
vant statistical pool for purposes of demonstrating discriminatory
exclusion is the number of minorities qualified to undertake the
particular task compared with the number of minorities actually
engaging in the task." However, this comparison does not ade-
quately reflect the minority experience in the educational setting
because there are fewer minorities qualified to enter undergraduate
and graduate school by virtue of the inequities of early education
programs. For example, a study conducted in eighteen public
schools in Chicago yielded some alarming statistics. Of the approx-
' Frank R. Parker, The Damaging Consequences of the Rehnquist Court's Commit-
ment to Colorblindness versus Racial Justice, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 763, 766 (1996) (quot-
ing Committee on the Status of Black Americans, National Research Council, A Commn
Destiny: Blacks and American Society, 377-78 (Gerald David Jaynes & Robin M. Wil-
liams, Jr. eds., 1989)).
,. See generally KozoL, supra note 146.
15 See id.
'~' See id.
,2 See 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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imately 6,700 children who enter ninth grade in those eighteen
schools, only 300 both graduate and read at the national aver-
age." Those very few who graduate and go to college rarely
read well enough to handle college-level courses. At the city's
community colleges, which receive most of their students from
Chicago's public schools, the noncompletion rate is 97 percent. 4
Furthermore, a 1995 study reported a white high school graduate is
far more likely to both attend college and graduate from college
than a black or Hispanic high school graduate. 5 Statistics are
similar in every major city in the United States. 6 In Texas, a
legal challenge to equalize school spending was defeated in
1972.' In 1989, the Texas Supreme Court held the huge dispari-
ty between school spending in the wealthiest and poorest districts
violated the state constitution.' However, the remedial plan
called for by the court has yet to be implemented. In 1991, school
spending in the state of Texas ranged from less than $2,000 per
child to almost $19,000 per child.'59 The plight of black and His-
panic students in public schools has been summarized as follows:
They attend largely separate and unequal schools; they are
disproportionately tracked into classes for slow learners or
the "educable mentally retarded;" their teachers give less to
them and expect less of them; they are more likely to be
disciplined; and they are more likely to drop out."6
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit and other circuits should permit
institutions of higher education to look beyond the actions of the
specific institution in question to other state agencies, like the
public school system, with strong links to the present effects of
past discrimination in higher education. Segmenting and compart-
mentalizing specific state agencies creates a situation where no one
can correct the effects of discrimination because no single agency
is solely responsible for creating the harm. Schools do not have to
"r See KOZOL, supra note 146, at 58-59.
' See id. at 59.
'' See Oppenheimer, supra note 6, at 964 (quoting AFFmRMATIVE AcTION REVIEW:
REPORT TO TIE PRESiDENT, at 12-13 (1995)).
I See generally id.
,. See Oppenheimer, supra note 6, at 962 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972)).
'm See id. (citing Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (1989)).
" See KOZOL, supra note 146, at 233.
'm Oppenheimer, supra note 6, at 965-66.
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desegregate because the concentrations of minorities in their dis-
tricts are created by housing patterns and the structuring of school
districts. Employers do not have to hire minorities who are not
well-educated because the schools are responsible for their unequal
preparedness. In this manner, inequalities become everyone's prob-
lem but nobody is forced or enabled to provide the solution. The
likely outcome of Hopwood's holding is that no agency of the state
will be responsible or accountable for the disparities in educational
achievement, and any discriminatory effect not resulting directly
from the Law School will be characterized as societal discrimina-
tion which cannot be remedied by the Law School.
At this point in our history, insufficient numbers of minorities
are being admitted into undergraduate and graduate institutions.
However, the fact that minorities are not being admitted into these
programs obviously does not suggest that they would be unable to
succeed once admitted if given an adequate educational foundation.
Quite to the contrary, studies have shown there are no real differ-
ences in graduation and bar passage rates between those minorities
who would have been admitted without the help of affirmative
action and those admitted because an affirmative action policy was
implemented. 6' Justice Brennan's opinion in Bakke recognized
that using race as a factor in admissions decisions requires reliance
on an immutable characteristic and is therefore not completely in
accord with our nation's deep belief that advancement should be
based on individual achievement. However, the idea that people
should gain admission to institutions based on merit is a social
philosophy, found nowhere in the United States Constitution. In
contrast, equality of opportunity for people of all races is mandated
by the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution and many feder-
al and state statutes. Nevertheless, those who argue that minorities
who deserve admittance will gain admittance without affirmative
action urge that the social philosophy should trump the mandate of
the Constitution.'62 Those who favor the illusion of meritocracy
ignore the history and context of race-relations in America.'
161. See Wightman, supra note 5.
62 This argument is reminiscent of Justice Holmes' dissent in Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905), in which he reminded us that cases are not decided on the basis of
the majority's personal convictions or prejudices. Rather, a constitution "is made for peo-
ple of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions nat-
ural and familiar or novel, and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon
the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution." Id. at 76.
" A belief in meritocracy requires faith in the idea that merit can be measured by
[Vol. 48:133
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Education occupies a unique position in American society, causing
the Supreme Court to recognize the vital role education plays:
[Education] is the very foundation of good citizenship.
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his envi-
ronment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of an education.'
C. Diversity is a Compelling State Interest
The judiciary has long recognized the significantly unique
interests inherent in higher education and has maintained a "hands-
off" policy on issues better suited for the judgment of acade-
mia." The main rationale behind this policy is that judges are
not equipped to second-guess the substance of academic decisions
because such decisions require "expert evaluation of cumulative
information and [are] not readily adapted to the procedural tools of
judicial or administrative decision making."'" As a result, in cas-
es like Bakke, justices have given deference to "'the four essential
freedoms' of a university-to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study."'67
If we as a society value these essential freedoms, we must
listen to one of the country's leading educators' thoughts on racial
diversity on college campuses. Harvard University's President, Neil
Rudenstine, wrote:
The range of undergraduate "interests, talents, backgrounds
and career goals affects importantly the educational experi-
grades and test scores. However, test scores have repeatedly been proven to inaccurately
predict future performance, and "the use of standardized tests and grades have long been
known to have a disparate impact on minority applicants." Leland Ware, Tales from the
Crypt: Does Strict Scrutiny Sound the Death Knell for Affirmative Action in Higher Edu-
cation?, 23 LC. & U.L. 43, 85-89 (1996).
' Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
" The Supreme Court has adhered to the notion that academic decisions are subject
only to a "narrow avenue of judicial review." Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474
U.S. 214, 227 (1985).
'6 Id. at 226 (quoting Board of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78,
89-90 (1978)).
167. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, L, concurring),
quoted in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
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ence of our students," because "a diverse student body is
an educational resource of coordinate importance with our
faculty and our library, laboratory and housing arrange-
ments."... "Such diversity is not an end in itself, or a
pleasant but dispensable accessory. It is the substance from
which much human learning, understanding, and wisdom
derive. It offers one of the most powerful ways of creating
the intellectual energy and robustness that lead to greater
knowledge... ." Therefore, affirmative action admissions
policies contribute to educational values at the core of the
mission of higher education."
Despite such conclusions regarding the value of racial diversity
in education and the need for affirmative action to produce this
diversity, the Hopwood court chose to ignore academia's experience
and declared a university's desire to achieve a diverse student body
is not a compelling interest.'69 According to Hopwood, "the use
of race, in and of itself, to choose students simply achieves a
student body that looks different. Such criterion is no more rational
on its own terms than would be choices based upon the physical
size or blood type of applicants. 17°
Such a narrowly drawn assertion ignores the systematic oppres-
sion of minorities which results in real differences in minorities'
life experiences and struggles. These unique experiences make
diversity on campus much more meaningful than merely a sea of
black, brown, red, yellow, and white faces.' 1 For example, stu-
'a NEiL L. RuDENsTINE, HARvARD UNiV., THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT 1993-1995: DI-
VERSITY AND LEARNING (1995), quoted in Note, An Evidentiary Framework for Diversity
as a Compelling Interest in Higher Education, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1357 (1996).
" See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2581 (1996).
170. Id. at 945.
'. See Winton W. Manning, The Pursuit of Fairness in Admissions to Higher Educa-
tion, in THE CARNEGIE CoUNCIL ON POLICY STUDIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION: A SUMMA-
RY OF REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 381, 383 (1980) ("Race is relevant in admis-
sions because it represents not mere skin color, but the consequences of the minority
racial experience in America."); see also, T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Con-
sciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1095 (1991):
To sustain the claim that a race-based investigation is intellectually unwarranted,
one would have to show that there is no reason to believe that the experiences
of members of racial minorities in this nation have not, to some extent, di-
verged from the experiences of whites. I simply find this an implausible sug-
gestion, given a three hundred year social history of having so much turn on
one's racial identification.
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dents of different backgrounds" I can offer very different perspec-
fives to class discussions, which may cause others to question the
foundations of their beliefs and which may challenge them to see
problems from a different point of view."TI A diverse student
body better prepares its members to live in a racially diverse coun-
try, where they will encounter people of various ethnicities and
viewpoints." Furthermore, education on college campuses does
not begin and end in the classroom. Most educational institutions
foster a community of students who interact socially, athletically,
and in their living situations. These extracurricular interactions
often prove to be extremely rewarding, especially .when they in-
volve individuals from myriad backgrounds.17
Since Justice Powell wrote "the interest of diversity is compel-
ling in the context of a university's admission program,"'76 legal
institutions have continued to recognize diversity as a compelling
state interest. For example, in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Education,
Justice O'Connor noted "a state interest in the promotion of racial
diversity has been found sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in the
See also Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed
Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 404 n.4 (1987) ("Mhe simple matter of the
color of one's skin so profoundly affects the way one is treated, so radically shapes what
one is allowed to think and feel about this society, that the decision to generalize from
this division is valid."); William G. Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance of Race,
PRINCETON ALUMNI WEEKLY 7, 9 (Sept. 26, 1977).
" Certainly there are many factors other than race that contribute to diversity, includ-
ing: socioeconomic status, marital status, disability, age, parental status, past work and
travel experience, rural or urban childhood, volunteer experience, marital status of parents,
number of times family moved while a child, etc. My emphasis on race and its contribu-
tion to diversity is not meant to detract from the importance of these other factors.
"a See JOHN D. WILSON, STUDENT LEARNING IN MIGHER EDUCATION 85 (1981) (cit-
ing WILLIAM G. PERRY, FORMS OF INTELLEcruAL AND ETIECAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE
COLLEGE YEARS: A SCHEME (1970)), quoted in Note, An Evidentiary Framework for
Diversity as a Compelling Interest in Higher Education, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1996).
17. Justice Powell wrote in Bakke.
An otherwise qualified medical student with a particular background-whether it
be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or disadvantaged-may bring to a
professional school of medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the
training of its student body and better equip its graduates to render with under-
standing their vital service to humanity.
438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978).
' See DEREK BOK, BEYOND THE IVORY TOwER: SOCIAL RESPONSmIBUIs OF TmE
MODERN UNIVERSITY 97 (1982), quoted in Note, An Evidentiary Framework for Diversity
as a Compelling Interest in Higher Education, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1996) ("Surveys
of graduating seniors have repeatedly shown that seniors believe that they have benefitted
as much from contact with one another as they have from their readings and lectures").
"6- 438 U.S. at 314.
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context of higher education [in Bakke], to support the use of racial
considerations in furthering that interest."'" Accordingly, the dis-
sent for the denial of rehearing en banc in Hopwood asserted,
"until the Supreme Court expressly overrules Bakke, student body
diversity is a compelling governmental interest for the purposes of
strict scrutiny."'' Furthermore, soon after Adarand was decided,
the Office of Legal Counsel of the United States Department of
Justice circulated a memorandum to the general counsels of all
federal agencies providing guidance as to how to narrowly tailor
their programs in accordance with constitutional mandates.'" This
memo interpreted the post-Bakke decisions to support the objective
of diversity in the academic context.'
Finally, the Hopwood court committed an egregious error in
considering the constitutionality of the diversity issue since it was
not an issue asserted on appeal. The Supreme Court has frequently
reiterated that courts should "decide constitutional questions only
when necessary to the disposition of the case at hand, and that
such decisions should be drawn as narrowly as possible."'8' Un-
fortunately, the Hopwood court "displayed no such discipline, in-
stead taking the unauthorized liberty of deciding the appropriate-
ness of diversity as an admissions criterion, not just the merits of
the instant admissions policy."'" The Hopwood court's broad rul-
ing is an ironic display of impudence; the case in which the Su-
preme Court originally admonished this type of judicial activism
was one concerning racism at the University of Texas Law
School. The Hopwood court was adamant about preventing
preferential treatment on the basis of race, yet failed to see it has
perpetuated its own dualistic treatment of the law. In 1950, the
Supreme Court refused to "paint with a broad brush and eliminate
the very regime which denied civil rights" to blacks. 4 However,
"?? Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment).
'78 Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720, 724 n.11 (1996).
" See Memorandum from U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel to all
General Counsels (Jun. 28, 1995), discussed in Leland Ware, Tales from the Crypt: Does
Strict Scrutiny Sound the Death Knell for Affirmative Action in Higher Education?, 23
J.C. & U.L. 43, 84-85 (1996).
' See id.
1. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 631 (1950) (citing Rescue Army v. Municipal
Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947)).
"' 84 F.3d at 725.
1" See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
" 84 F.3d at 725.
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Hopwood recently borrowed the broad brush the Supreme Court
refused to use and ensured the University of Texas Law School
will continue to struggle in its quest for a diversified student body.
D. The Hopwood Court Ignores the Reality of the Present Effects
of Past Discrimination and the Continuing Need to Remedy Them
The court in Hopwood mistakenly determined the University of
Texas Law School had "failed to show a compelling state interest
in remedying the present effects of past discrimination sufficient to
maintain the use of race in its admissions system."'85 The court
arrived at this conclusion after making several assumptions. First, it
stated there must be a showing of prior discrimination by the gov-
ernment actor involved before racial classifications can be used to
remedy the discrimination."6 Second, the government actor must
prove present effects of past discrimination impede minority matric-
ulation." Both of these assumptions are well settled in law.'
However, the Hopwood court ignored the reality of the effects of
racism at the University of Texas Law School in applying these
principles to the facts of the case.
1. Racial Discrimination Does Not End When Laws Sanctioning
Discrimination Are Repealed.
When the Hopwood case was decided in the Fifth Circuit in
March, 1996, it was not the first time the University of Texas Law
School was a party to litigation concerning impermissible racial
classifications. Several decades ago, Heman Marion Sweatt, an
African-American, challenged the Law School's rejection of his
application, which the Law School stipulated occurred "solely be-
cause he is a Negro."'89 At that time, no law school in the state
of Texas would admit black students based on state law." As a
'" Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 955 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. CL
2581 (1996).
,u See id. at 949.
,. See id. at 951.
' See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
274 (1986) (plurality opinion) (Powell, J.); Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 153 (4th
Cir. 1994).
'" Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 631 (1950).
'* See id. See TEx. CONST. art. VII, §§ 7, 14; Tnx. REv. Cv. STAT. arts. 2643b,
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result of Sweatt's challenge, the State of Texas was forced to open
a law school at the Texas State University for Negroes which
lacked accreditation, had a very small library, only five faculty
members, and one alumnus who was a member of the Texas
Bar.'9 ' The University of Texas Law School, in contrast, was ful-
ly accredited, had nineteen distinguished faculty members, an enor-
mous library housing over 65,000 volumes, a law review journal,
moot court facilities, scholarship funds, and Order of the Coif
affiliation.'" Furthermore, its alumni "occup[ied] the most distin-
guished positions in the private practice of the law and in the
public life of the State."'93 Despite these differences, the court of
civil appeals affirmed a lower court ruling that the Texas State
University for Negroes offered Sweatt "privileges, advantages, and
opportunities for the study of law substantially equivalent to those
offered by the State to white students at the University of Tex-
as."' 94 This ruling prompted the Supreme Court to grant certiora-
ri'95 to determine the constitutionality of distinguishing between
students of different races in professional and graduate educa-
tion. 1'
After an examination of the facilities available to whites and
"Negroes," the Court held they could not "find substantial equality
in the educational opportunities offered white and Negro law stu-
dents by the State."'" Consequently, the Court concluded the on-
ly remedy available was to require Sweatt to be admitted to the
University of Texas Law School in order for him to "claim his full
constitutional right: legal education equivalent to that offered by
the State to students of other races."1 98 Unfortunately, a year after
Sweatt entered the Law School, he left "without graduating after
being subjected to racial slurs from students and professors, cross
burnings, and tire slashings."' 99
Although this case occurred over forty years ago, the effects of
Texas' explicit, statutorily mandated refusal to admit African-Amer-
2719, 2900 (Vernon 1925 & Supp.).
m. See 339 U.S. at 633.
' See id. at 632-33.
191. Id. at 633.
" Sweatt v. Painter, 210 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
91 See Sweatt v. Painter, 338 U.S. 865 (1949).
See 339 U.S. at 631.
. Id. at 633.
I" d. at 635.
9. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 555 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
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leans to its state law school continue to be felt today. For example,
"during the 1950s and into the 1960s, the University of Texas
continued to implement discriminatory policies against both Afri-
can-American and Mexican-American students." Furthermore:
It was not until 1983 that Texas even agreed, after years of
threats of federal action, to an acceptable plan to deseg-
regate its higher education system. In 1987 and again in
1994, the Department of Education instructed Texas to
maintain its plan. To this day, Texas' higher education
system has not yet been declared in compliance with Title
VI and the Fourteenth Amendment." 1
Surely these facts satisfy the Supreme Court's requirement that
a government actor have "a strong basis in evidence for its conclu-
sion that remedial action is necessary." Usually, it is very diffi-
cult to prove intentional racial discrimination since it is easily
masked. However, in this case, there is direct evidence of state
statutes requiring this specific state body to intentionally discrimi-
nate on the basis of racem This evidence easily satisfies even
the most rigorous application of the test articulated in Hopwood.
2. When Fashioning Solutions to Racial Discrimination, a Court
Should Not Ignore the Victim's Perspective in Ensuring the
Remedy is Realistic in Achieving its Goals
The Hopwood court fails to acknowledge the victim's perspec-
tive by minimizing the effect of a racially hostile university
environment on a person's decision to attend that particular institu-
tion. Certainly, one major consideration in a prospective college
freshman's choice of colleges is the atmosphere of the capus'
For instance, if a student is politically inclined, he or she might
M Id.
2", Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720, 725 (5th. Cir. 1996).
" City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989); Wygant v. Jack-
son Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986).
See TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. arts. 2643b, 2719, 2900 (Vernon 1925 & Supp.).
a,' Often, a large distinction can be drawn between the African-American experience,
on the whole, and the white majority experience. The majority perspective delimits the
effects of discrimination on its victims in order to serve its own agenda of denying the
existence of the problem. However, an honest examination of the consequences of con-
scious or subconscious 'racism for minorities in America reveals the overwhelming signifi-
cance of the effect it has on their daily lives and their chances for success. See generally
Oppenheimer, supra note 6.
2" See Ware, supra note 163, at 63.
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seek a university which has an atmosphere conducive to debate and
public awareness. If a student is a member of a minority group,
that student will have to consider the extent to which the university
fosters an atmosphere of acceptance. If a university has a reputa-
tion of racial isolation or hostility, association with that university
by the prospective freshman may be avoided at all costs. Such an
environment is likely to interfere in a person's efforts to pursue his
or her studies, make friends, and take advantage of the varied
experiences and educational opportunities available outside the
classroom.'
The Law School at issue in Hopwood has presented well-docu-
mented evidence of the fact minorities still find the atmosphere at
the Law School to be hostile and racist.' Nevertheless, the court
attributes the Law School's lingering bad reputation with minorities
to be a result of present societal discrimination, wholly untouched
by the de jure discrimination of recent years."' This finding, too,
ignores reality. A child growing up in America today is not igno-
rant of the racial tensions lingering in our society. If that child's
father had been denied admission to an academic institution be-
cause of his race, his child would probably feel animus towards the
institution that discriminated against him. If so, that tension would
be predicated on the school's past discriminatory actions rather
than the present state of racism in society. The Hopwood court
shamelessly disregards this fact in asserting that the effects of
purposeful discrimination have been forgotten or forgiven by the
present generation. Racism follows a repetitious pattern: it is passed
down by generations, unless and until the barriers to achieving
equal opportunity in education are removed.
Second, the Fifth Circuit failed to view the remedy for past
See id. See also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978):
10 or 20 black students [in a class of 1,100] could not begin to bring to their
classmates and to each other the variety of points of view, backgrounds and
experiences of blacks in the United States. Their small numbers might also cre-
ate a sense of isolation among the black students themselves and thus make it
more difficult for them to develop and achieve their potential.
Minority applications for the fall of 1997 class at the University of Texas Law School
dropped 38% for blacks and 14% for Hispanics. Eighty-three percent fewer blacks and
fifty-one percent fewer Hispanics were admitted in this class. See Michelle Locke, Black
Law Students Hurt By Affirmative Action Ban, THE DENVER POST, Jul. 12, 1997, at A4.
207. See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 572 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 953-54 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 2581 (1996).
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discrimination from the perspective of the victim in choosing .the
representative attributes it suggests contribute to diversity. The
court said that an institution "may properly favor one applicant
over another because of his ability to play the cello, make a
downfield tackle, or understand chaos theory... [or on the basis
of his] home state or relationship to school alumni." Further-
more, the law school can look at factors such as "unusual or sub-
stantial extracurricular activities in college[,] ... whether an
applicant's parents attended the law school, or the applicant's eco-
nomic and social background." '21 These proffered examples Mus-
trate another instance of the court failing to provide a viable solu-
tion for the minority victim because these unique qualities are not
as easily attainable for the average African-American student. For
example, the average black student in a public school in Texas is
probably not offered nor could afford the luxury of learning to
play the cello. Moreover, his elementary and secondary education
could be, on the average, so poor that he did not receive an ade-
quate educational foundation to learn chaos theory. Texas statutes
closing the doors of superior institutions to blacks as recently as
the 1950s preclude many applicants from having a parent who is
an alumnus. An applicant may not have any other significant ties
to important alumni for the same reason. Therefore, the charac-
teristics the Fifth Circuit asserts promote diversity in reality pro-
duce an intellectually diverse group of economically secure white
students rather than a colorful melting pot. If the Law School
seeks true diversity, they must attach some significance to a
person's race.2 ' Consequently, the court's rejection of race as a
proxy for other characteristics that contribute to diversity is not
grounded in reality.
Finally, the Hopwood court failed to consider the African-
American experience in fashioning a remedy for discrimination by
its exclusive reliance on white scholars to bolster its opinion 2
"Never have white judges relying exclusively on the work of white
scholars spoken so authoritatively about the black experience in
America."'213 This perpetrator's perspective ignores a plethora of
scholarly legal works illustrating the duality of the African-Ameri-
"' Id. at 946.
210. Id.
2. See generally Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1977).
212, See Ware, supra note 163, at 77-78.
2-3 Id. at 78.
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can and white experience in America, 14 providing additional and
stunning examples of how the Hopwood court ignored the minority
perspective in attempting to design a remedy for past discrimina-
tion.
3. The Fifth Circuit's Fear that Allowing Affirmative Action in
Higher Education Will Lead to the Use of Affirmative Action in
Any Context Which Can Be Linked to a Person's Educational
Attainment is Unfounded
Another argument the Fifth Circuit advances to justify its
sweeping defeat of affirmative action is if the courts allow affirma-
tive action in higher education to remedy inequities in primary and
secondary education, the state would be unable to deny a state
body the right to use affirmative action to remedy any inequity
perceived to be linked to a person's educational attainment.2"5 For
example, the court claims the likely result of allowing a race-based
"plus" for graduate school admission would lead to "broad based
preferences in hiring, government contracts, licensing, and any
other state activity that in some way is affected by the educational
attainment of the applicants."2 6 This argument is not grounded in
reality for several reasons.
First, states could easily restrict affirmative action programs to
the educational context, as there are many justifications for these
programs specific to the education context that do not apply else-
where.2"7 Further, there is a much stronger and more direct link
between a person's primary and secondary education and his or her
ability to pursue education beyond the secondary level than the
link between a person's primary and secondary education and his
or her employment status or ability to attract a government con-
tract. If a person lacks basic reading and writing skills initially
learned in primary school and necessary to progress successfully
through high school, he or she will be less likely to achieve the
standardized test scores required to attend college and graduate
school. There is a natural progression from adequate education at
2"* See Ware, supra note 163, at 78 (citing DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BoTroM
OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) (illustrating the experiences of blacks
in academia); W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (1965) (describing the con-
flicting experiences of blacks and whites); PATRICIA WiiAMs, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE
AND RIGHTS (1991) (remarking upon the influence of race on the adjudicative process)).
2-. See 78 F.3d at 950.
216. Id.
". See supra Part I B.
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the primary level to success in higher learning. If this continuum is
interrupted, the next step will lack the stability to support the de-
mands the student will encounter. In contrast, a direct path between
a person's early educational years and their ability to receive a
government contract or license cannot be so easily drawn. Many
factors intervene, such as the laborer's reputation for quality work,
ability to obtain raw materials at a low price, and access to effec-
tive marketing. Opportunities for success in these contexts do not
depend as directly on the adequacy of a person's educational foun-
dation. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit's prediction rings hollow.
4. The "Psychology of Discrimination" in America Ensures that
Race Will Affect Decision-Making to the Disadvantage of
Minorities
A final example of how the Hopwood court ignores reality by
asserting that colorblind acts follow from colorblind laws lies in
the "psychology of discrimination."2 "8 Relying on several studies
of racial attitudes and beliefs of white adults,2"9  David
Oppenheimer asserts that discriminatory attitudes are often motivat-
ed by unconscious stereotypes that cause significant harm to minor-
ities. 2 These studies show that while overt racism has "lost fa-
vor socially .... racist attitudes lie close beneath the surface of
our society."' For example, a 1990 study asked white subjects
to rate various ethnic groups on character traits including level of
intelligence and whether they were hard-working or lazy. 2 The
results are shocking. On the question of intelligence, 53.2% of
whites rated blacks as less intelligent than whites, and 53.5% of
whites rated Hispanics as less intelligent than whites.m Further-
more, on the question of hard-working as opposed to lazy, 62.2%
of whites rated blacks to be lazier than whites, and 54.1% of
whites rated Hispanics to be lazier than whites.' Consider the
2,' Oppenheimer, supra note 6, at 946.
219. See Oppenheimer, supra note 6, at 946-53 (construing GORDON ALLPORT, THE
NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954); HowARD SCHMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATITruDES IN AMERI-
CA, TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS (1988); TOM W. SMITH, NATIONAL OPINION RE-
SEARCH CENTER, ETHNIC IMAGES, GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY TOPICAL REPORT No. 19
(1990); James R. Kluegel, Trends in White's Explanations of Black-White Socioeconomic
Status, 1977-1989, 55 AM. Soc. REV. 512 (1990)).
See Oppenheimer, supra note 6, at 946.
2'" Id. at 947.
2a See id. at 950.
2_ See id. at 951.
24 See id.
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significance of these underlying beliefs in the context of education-
al and employment discrimination. Certainly, decision-makers seek
candidates who they perceive to be intelligent and hard-working,
yet they are far more likely to consciously or unconsciously con-
sider the black or Hispanic applicant to be less intelligent and
hard-working than the white applicant with similar qualifica-
tions.' Consequently, the Hopwood court's assertion that dis-
crimination has ended with the removal of all legal barriers to an
equal education is not supported by the reality of life in America
in 1997 any more than the Supreme Court Justices' admonition
that "separate" meant "equal" in 1894.
I. CONCLUSION
There is no more appropriate analogy than that used by Donna
Thompson-Schneider in her analysis of affn-mative action after
Adarand "'You do not take a person who, for years, has been
hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting
line of a race and then say, "You are free to compete with all the
others," and still justly believe that you have been completely
fair."' The United States has a history of inequality of opportu-
nity for minorities in many facets of life.' Nevertheless, because
we now recognize this inequality and have taken steps to prevent
its recurrence in the future, some people believe we have dis-
charged our duty to rectify the mistakes of the past. However, we
cannot truly ameliorate future conditions of race relations without
realistically dealing with those in the present who were harmed by
past discrimination. The critics of affirmative action would benefit
'- See id. at 952.
2" Donna Thompson-Schneider, Note, Paved With Good Intentions: Affirmative Action
after Adarand?, 31 TULSA LJ. 611, 611 (1996) (quoting Tm NEGRO IN TWENTIM
CENTURY AMERICA 226 (John Hope Franklin and Isidore Starr, eds., 1967)).
22" Justice Marshall vividly illustrated this point in his Bakke opinion:
The position of the Negro today in America is the tragic but inevitable conse-
quence of centuries of unequal treatment. Measured by any benchmark of com-
fort or achievement, meaningful equality remains a distant dream for the Ne-
gro .... At every point from birth to death the impact of the past is reflected
in the still disfavored position of the Negro. In light of the sorry history of
discrimination and its devastating impact on the lives of Negroes, bringing the
Negro into the mainstream of American life should be a state interest of the
highest order. To fail to do so is to ensure that America will forever remain a
divided society.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 395-96 (1978).
[Vol. 48:133
RACE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN ADMISSIONS
from reading and truly attempting to understand the words of Jus-
tice Stevens in his dissent in Adarand:
There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a
policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and
one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination. Invidious
discrimination is an engine of oppression, subjugating a
disfavored group to enhance or maintain the power of the
majority. Remedial race-based preferences reflect the oppo-
site impulse: a desire to foster equality in society. No
sensible conception of the Government's constitutional
obligation to "govern impartially" should ignore this dis-
tinction.
While the Clinton administration has urged universities that
Bakke remains the "law of the land" despite Hopwood,' 9 and
leaders of some elite institutions like Harvard and Yale continue to
support affirmative action, many other institutions are changing
their policies to insulate themselves against potential lawsuits.'
These schools are attempting to substitute race-based affirmative
action with a colorblind, class-based standard to increase racial
diversity on campus. However, recent studies show that class-based
programs will cause the numbers of blacks and Hispanics admitted
to institutions of higher education to drop dramatically."1 Conse-
quently, those concerned with the numbers of minorities on college
campuses will have an almost insurmountable challenge to discover
a colorblind system that will ensure minority presence. The
colorblindness required by strict scrutiny "has been transformed
from a mechanism that was used to strike down segregation to a
vehicle which will inhibit integration. 'z Consequently, in order
to preserve the many advancements America has seen in race rela-
tions and further ameliorate the present status of equal opportunity,
515 U.S. at 243 (citation omitted).
2" See Lincoln Kaplan, The Hopwood Effect Kicks in on Campus, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REPORT, Dec. 23, 1996, at 26.
2" See id. at 27. States currently reforming their university admissions programs in-
clude Arkansas, Michigan, Wisconsin, Washington, Arizona, Florida, Colorado, and Geor-
gia. See id.
"' See id. at 28. At the University of California Boalt Hall Law School, not one
black has enrolled to enter in the fall of 1997's incoming class of 270 students, which is
the first group admitted since the University of California ended affirmative action. Past
classes enrolled as many as 31 black students. Michelle Locke, Black Law Students Hurt
by Affirmative Action Ban, THE DENVER PosT, Jul. 12, 1997, at A4.
m Ware, supra note 163, at 89.
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affirmative action in admissions programs must be retained. Justice
Blackmun's admonition remains true today: "In order to get beyond
racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way.
And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them
differently. We cannot-we dare not-let the Equal Protection
Clause perpetuate racial supremacy."
STEPHANM E. STRAUBt
'3. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1977) (Blackinun, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
t This Note would not have been possible without the inspiration of my advisor,
Professor Edward A. Meatus, Jr., the most dedicated, stimulating, and generous educator I
have ever known. I also wish to thank my family for their unconditional love and support
in everything I do.
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